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Abstract 
 
This article explores Claudia Card’s hypothesis that social death is the distinctive 
harm of genocide. Drawing on original in-depth interviews with individuals from the 
genocide-affected regions of Darfur and the Nuba Mountains in Sudan (now living in, 
and interviewed in, the US and the UK), I illustrate the value and validity of the 
concept of social death as a phenomenological lens for understanding the depth, 
extent and character of genocide’s harms for its victims and survivors. Aided by the 
work of a number of authors (including Elias and Jean-Luc Nancy), I outline a 
relational interpretation of Card’s important scholarship in order to show that 
understanding the distinctiveness of genocide requires that we also consider, in 
ontological terms, what it means to be human. I seek to do this in a way that may 
form the basis of a flexible definitional approach to genocide, and which overcomes 
oppositions between individualist and collectivist approaches to conceptualising 
harm. Often falling through the gaps of technical legal discourse and conventional 
frameworks of understanding, the profound, existential harm of genocide can be 
challenging to grasp. By centring the concept of social death, this article aims to 
contribute to our ability to do.  
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The way I feel is that my life has become tasteless1 
 
I feel I have lost my identity2 
 
You are cut off from your roots, you are uprooted3   
 
They snatch everything out of you. They leave you empty4
 
 
                                                        
1 Interview 1. 
2 Interview 4. 
3 Interview 11. 
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Suddenly you find yourself as if you are alone in this world. This is the 
equivalent to death. You may come to the conclusion that it is better for you to 
die5  
 
 
Introduction 
Genocide is in public, political, and scholarly discourse perceived as a ‘special form 
of wrongdoing, a class of moral evil unto itself.’6  Yet the reasons why, exactly, 
genocide has this unique moral status, and is as such deserving of a singular moral 
opprobrium, are often only superficially interrogated. Whilst there have indeed been 
thoughtful and important philosophical interventions on the issue by a number of 
scholars,7 dominant and conventional answers to this question remain centred on the 
view that genocide denotes a unique form of mass killing that is state-directed, 
ethnically motivated, systematic and pre-meditated. This mass killing, moreover, is 
deemed genocidal only if it is accompanied and driven by a particularly evil mind set, 
namely, the perpetrators’ intent to physically destroy the targeted group. Indeed, 
reliance on the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide has meant that, for many scholars, and of course lawyers and 
policymakers, ‘intent’ is at the absolute core of what makes genocide distinctive.8 
Sudan is a case in point; debates about the presence or absence of a specific genocidal 
intent have been central to broader interpretations of the situation, and the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Interview 18. 
5 Interview 23. 
6 Lee, S., ‘The Moral Distinctiveness of Genocide,’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(3), 
2010, p. 335. 
7  For example, MacCleod, C. M., ‘An Alternative Approach to the Harm of Genocide,’ 
Politics, 32(3), 2012, pp. 197-206; Abed, M., ‘Clarifying the Concept of Genocide,’ 
Metaphilosophy, 37(3-4), July 2006, pp. 308 – 330; Shuster, M., ‘Genocide and Philosophy’, 
in Moses, D. and Bloxham D., (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 217-35; Boghossian, P., ‘The Concept of Genocide,’ 
Journal of Genocide Research, 12 (2010), pp. 69-80; Lee, S.P., ‘The Moral Distinctiveness of 
Genocide’, Journal of Political Philosophy 18(3), (2010), pp. 335–356; May, L., Genocide: A 
Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and ‘How is humanity 
harmed by genocide?’ International Legal Theory, 11(1), Summer 2005, pp. 1-23; Lang, B., 
‘The Evil in Genocide,’ in Roth, K. (ed.), Genocide and Human Rights: A Philosophical 
Guide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Card, C., ‘Genocide and Social Death’, 
Hypatia 18(1), 2003, pp. 63–79, ‘The Paradox of Genocidal Rape aimed at Enforced 
Pregnancy,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46 (2008), pp. 176-89, Confronting Evils: 
Terrorism, Torture, and Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); 
Fackenheim, E., ‘The Holocaust and Philosophy,' Journal of Philosophy, 82(10), 1985, pp. 
505-514.  
8  The full text of the 1948 Convention is available here: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf. 
 3 
of an official genocide determination.9   
However, often implicitly underpinned by narrow and sociologically 
problematic legalistic paradigms, these debates have tended to overlook alternative, 
potentially richer approaches to apprehending and understanding genocide, including 
those that draw on the original conceptualisation of Raphael Lemkin, who emphasised 
the fundamentally social and cultural nature of genocidal destruction.10 Indeed, for 
Lemkin, who coined the term in the 1940s, techniques of genocidal destruction could 
be: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.11 
Moses aptly captures Lemkin’s formulation of genocide as a 'total social practice,' 
affecting all aspects of group life.12 Lemkin’s broad approach thus contrasts with the 
skew towards physical destruction evident in the UN Convention. Moreover, whilst it 
may be the case that, as Jones writes, ‘Most scholars and legal theorists agree that 
intent defines genocide,’13 for Powell, the logical conclusion of the focus on intent is 
that: 
 
The outcome of a course of action matters less than the intent behind it; 
put another way, the experiences of the victims count for less than the 
moral quality of the accused perpetrator.14  
 
This is not to suggest that the issue of intent is unimportant or irrelevant to our 
broader understanding.15  However, the focus on intent as the uniquely ‘evil’ and 
                                                        
9 Such a determination was for this reason rejected by a UN commission of inquiry on the 
situation on Darfur in 2005. See, United Nations, Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 January 2005), 
available online at: http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.  
10  See Lemkin, R., Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of 
Government, Proposals for Redress, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1944). Especially chapter IX.  
11 Lemkin, Axis Rule, pp. 82-90. Martin Crook and Damien Short have recently developed the 
concept of ‘ecologically induced genocide’ as an additional ‘method’ or ‘technique’ of 
genocide. See, Martin Crook and Damien Short, ‘Marx, Lemkin and the genocide-ecocide 
nexus,’ International Journal of Human Rights, 18(3), 2014, pp. 298-319. 
12  Moses, D., ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History,’ in 
Moses D., (ed), Empire, Colony, Genocide, p. 13. 
13 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 3rd Ed., (Oxon: Routledge, 2017). 
14 Powell, C., Barbaric Civilisation, p. 75. 
15 Bill Wringe, for example, argues interestingly that genocide is qualitatively distinct from 
‘mass murder’ due to the form of ‘collective action manifesting a collective evil will’ that it 
exhibits. See Wringe, B., ‘Collective Action and the Peculiar Evil of Genocide,’ 
Metaphilosophy, 37(3-4), July 2006, pp. 376 – 392. 
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defining feature of genocide arguably (perhaps unintentionally) obscures the 
perspectives and experiences of victims.  
In contrast, here I explore an approach that seeks explicitly to ground our 
understanding in the lived experiences of genocide’s victims and survivors. Drawing 
on Claudia Card’s harm-based concept of ‘social death,’ and developed through 
examination of the case of Sudan, it is suggested that such a reorientation provides an 
illuminating route into important questions about genocide’s distinctiveness, and 
indeed the ethical and analytical value of the concept. The analysis is based on 
detailed empirical engagement with original victim/survivor testimony from 
individuals originally from the genocide-affected regions of Darfur and the Nuba 
Mountains, collected during in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The individuals 
interviewed were all living in, and interviewed in, the US and the UK.   
Developing Card’s important scholarship, I outline a relational interpretation 
of the concept of social death, aided by the work of a number of authors, in order to 
show that understanding the distinctiveness of genocide requires that we also 
consider, in ontological terms, what it means to be human. I seek to do this in a way 
that may form the basis of a flexible definitional approach, and which overcomes 
oppositions between individualist and collectivist approaches to conceptualising 
harm, and specifically the harm of social death.  
Using the lens of social death draws out with greater salience the depth of the 
experience of loss and harm associated with genocide. It also helps us explain why 
and how social and cultural destruction can be genocidal. The profound, existential 
harm of genocide can be challenging to grasp, and often falls through the gaps of 
technical legal discourse and conventional frameworks of understanding. As the 
testimony presented illustrates, centring social death adds a valuable and 
complementary phenomenological layer of understanding to Raphael Lemkin’s broad 
social and cultural conceptualisation. A renewed focus on such experiential 
dimensions has potential not only to deepen appreciation of the meaning of genocidal 
destruction for its victims, but also to contribute to an understanding of why such 
destruction and the harm it inflicts is distinctive. Doing so may also further 
understanding of how processes of genocide unfold over time, and how best to 
support victim/survivor communities in the context of reconstruction efforts in post-
genocide situations.   
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‘Social death’ and the distinctive harm of genocide 
Why do we need the specific crime or concept of genocide? What does the term 
capture above and beyond, for example, mass murder or crimes against humanity? 
One way authors have approached this question is through examination of the primary 
‘object’ that is damaged or harmed by genocide. MacLeod notes that there exists a 
‘general consensus’ in the scholarly literature on this issue that genocide should be 
characterized either in terms of damage done to individuals, or damage done to 
groups targeted by genocide.16 As Steven P. Lee writes: 
 
What or who is the chief object of harm when genocide is committed, 
individuals or the groups to which they belong? Is genocide distinguished 
by harm to the group itself, with the harm done to its members only a 
means to the harm to the group (as with collectivist accounts), or is 
genocide distinguished by the harm done to its individual victims?17 
  
Aligned with the individualist approach, the question that Card believed to be central 
in any argument to the effect that genocide is distinctive is this: 
 
Is any ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that 
would not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals 
rather than because of their group membership?18  
  
Her answer is that there is indeed a harm that is ethically distinct:  
 
What distinguishes genocide is not that it has a different kind of victim, 
namely, groups (although it is a convenient shorthand to speak of targeting 
groups). Rather, the kind of harm suffered by individual victims, in virtue 
of their group membership, is not captured by other crimes.19  
 
                                                        
16 MacLeod, ‘The Harm of Genocide,’ p. 197. 
17 Lee, ‘The Moral Distinctiveness,’ pp. 338-9. 
18 Card, ‘Genocide and Social Death,’ p. 73. 
19 Ibid, p. 68. Emphasis added. 
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Card’s argument centres on the related concepts of ‘social death’ and ‘social vitality.’ 
Specific to genocide, Card says, is the extreme harm inflicted on its victims’ ‘social 
vitality,’ severe loss of which can result in ‘social death.’ Social vitality, according to 
Card, is constituted through connections and relationships — family and community, 
contemporary and intergenerational — that 'create the contexts and identities that give 
meaning and shape to our lives.' The loss of such connections, connections that link 
an individual to both the past and future, is a 'profound loss.’20 It may amount to a 
‘loss of identity and consequently a serious loss of meaning for one’s existence.’21 
Card borrows the phrase, social death, from Orlando Patterson, who first described 
the concept in his book, Slavery and Social Death, to describe the condition of slaves. 
Patterson writes: 'if the slave no longer belonged to a community, if he had no social 
existence outside of his master, then what was he? The initial response in almost all 
slaveholding societies was to define the slave as a socially dead person.’22
  
Card argues the concept of ‘cultural genocide’ is redundant and misleading; 
social death implies ‘cultural death,’ and the separate term erroneously assumes some 
genocides do not include cultural death.23 She writes:  
 
The intentional production of social death in a people or community is the 
central evil of genocide. That is so not only when a genocide is mainly 
cultural but even when it is homicidal on a massive scale. Social death 
distinguishes the evil of genocide, morally, from the evils of other mass 
murders. Even genocidal murder can be understood as an extreme means 
to the primary goal of social death.24 
 
Card also questions the assumption that social death is less extreme than physical 
death; a sentiment, it will be seen, also expressed by some of genocide’s survivors.  
Card’s account of social death shifts attention away from perpetrator 
intentions, individual deaths and mass violence, towards losses of 'relationships, 
connections, and the foundational institutions' which create community, and through 
                                                        
20 Card, Confronting Evils, p. 237. 
21 Card, ‘Genocide and Social Death,’ p. 63. 
22 Patterson, O., Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, (Harvard, 1982), p. 38. 
23 Card, C., ‘Genocide and Social Death,’ p. 63. See also Short, D., ‘Cultural genocide and 
indigenous peoples: a sociological approach,’ International Journal of Human Rights, 2014, 
14:6, pp. 833-848. 
24 Card, Confronting Evils, p. 237. 
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which individuals form identities and establish meaningful lives, and even meaningful 
deaths.25
 
That which is targeted, damaged or destroyed in a genocidal process is not 
necessarily a population per se, but rather the ties, bonds, and relationships — 
economic, community, cultural, political, religious etc. — that in Card’s terms 'turn a 
population into a community or people.’26 
 
But what, more precisely, constitutes a ‘people’? In a valuable development of 
Card’s work, Abed provides an account of the features that make a group susceptible 
to the harm of genocidal social death – for not all groups are susceptible.27 According 
to him, a group can suffer genocide if its members ‘consent to a life in common,’ if its 
culture is ‘comprehensive,’ and if ‘the social structure of the group is such that 
membership cannot easily be renounced.’ If these conditions are present, then the 
‘flourishing of the group’s culture and social ethos will have profound and far-
reaching effects on the well-being of its individual members.’ And as such, systematic 
destruction of social and cultural institutions will result in individual group members 
suffering the distinctive harms, deprivations, and suffering ‘peculiar’ to genocide.28 
 
Decentring ‘intent’ 
Although in the above quotation Card writes of genocide in terms of the ‘intentional 
production’ of social death, elsewhere she has suggested that the production of social 
death as a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 29  or ‘willingly accepted’ 30  consequence is 
sufficient for a genocide classification. Whilst detailed philosophical consideration of 
genocidal intent and Card’s understanding of it is beyond the scope of this article, a 
brief discussion will be useful to give a sense of how an understanding of genocide as 
social death might fit into broader theoretical frameworks. As an initial point, the 
focus on social death defended in this article implicitly embodies a conceptual 
privileging the experiences of victims over the mental states, subjectivity and moral 
quality of individual perpetrators or groups of perpetrators. In this sense, it could be 
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
26 Card, C., Confronting Evils, p. 278. 
27 Not all groups are vulnerable to such harm. As Abed notes, we must be able to explain why 
the class of people who enjoy karaoke, for example, would not be victims of a genocidal 
crime if they were targeted. 
28 Abed, M., ‘Clarifying the Concept of Genocide,’ Metaphilosophy, 37(3-4), July 2006, p. 
308. 
29 Card, ‘Genocide and Social Death,’ p. 78. 
30 Card, Confronting Evils, p. 259. 
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seen as underpinned by a consequentialist logic insofar as it is concerned above all 
with the distinctive harm experienced by victims. If our sociological concepts are 
inevitably in significant ways constructions we impose on social reality, how we 
choose to ‘carve up’ and represent this reality will have important ethical 
implications, particularly regarding how our attention and focus is directed. In this 
sense, in addition to a claim about why genocide is a distinctive category of social 
violence, privileging the harm experienced by victims, rather than expending time and 
energy determining the presence or not of perpetrators’ specific mental states, is a 
choice underpinned by certain ethical considerations about what, in situations that are 
likely to be complex, urgent and fast-moving, is most important. It is a conceptual 
structuring, in short, that compels us to attend first and foremost to the existential 
horror of genocide.     
Yet a deeper theoretical claim could also be made. Much thinking about 
genocide remains tied to simplistic and decontextualized conceptions of intent in 
order to explain its occurrence. This common-sense understanding of intent underpins 
a more general implicit linear causal model of genocide’s origins and unfolding as a 
top-down, coordinated and preconceived plan. In other words, as Martin Shaw writes, 
dominant approaches to genocide tend to assume an ‘uncomplicated nexus between 
perpetrator intentions and outcomes.’ However, it is precisely this assumption that 
makes conventional approaches so ‘sociologically unconvincing.’ 31  Actor-based 
definitions centred on perpetrators’ ‘intent,’ while perhaps emotionally satisfying, and 
unavoidable in a legal context, are ‘not sufficient for the explanatory purposes of 
social science, for which social relations and context are more important.’ 32 
Paradigms that privilege intent tend to neglect the complex ways in which genocidal 
policies (and intent) evolve and radicalize over time, presenting a distorted picture of 
genocide’s complex genesis.33 They are, moreover, unable to conceptually grasp the 
ways in which genocidal logics may be systemically embedded in broader historical 
processes and structural contexts. Such logics, in some contexts, arguably embody an 
agential capacity of their own, constituting and superseding the will or agency of 
                                                        
31 Shaw, M. What is Genocide? pp. 93-4. Emphasis in original. 
32 Shaw, M., ‘From Comparative to International,’ p. 649. Emphasis in original. 
33 See, for example, Browning, C. R., The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of 
Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2004). 
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consciously ‘intending’ individual human subjects.34  
Indeed, important work in genocide studies has contested the view that 
genocide should be defined as a systematic, state-directed and ‘always consciously 
chosen policy.’ 35  Tony Barta, for example, has adopted a more structural 
interpretation using the concept of ‘relations of genocide.’36 In seeking to uncover 
these ‘relations,’ Barta was guided by the ‘Marxian principle that there are historical 
realities (impersonal and powerful, though produced by human activities) that 
influence perceptions, actions and relationships in ways that are independent of 
individuals’ intentions.’37 Patrick Wolfe has similarly made a compelling case that 
genocide should be conceptualized as a ‘structure’ exhibiting a ‘logic of elimination,’ 
rather than an ‘event.’38 And as Damien Short has recently argued in relation to the 
genocidal consequences of ‘ecocide’ for indigenous communities around the world, 
genocidal social death can be induced without a ‘specific intent to destroy’ through 
ecological destruction. Drawing on the work of Wolfe, he further writes that even 
genocidal mass murder may occur ‘through sporadic and uncoordinated action or as a 
by-product of an incompatible expansionist economic system.’39  
The conceptual privileging of harm suggested here is underpinned, therefore, 
not only by ethical considerations, but may also form part of a more nuanced socio-
ontological approach to framing genocide that can accommodate more complex 
conceptualizations of intent and distributed forms of agency.40 Although these issues 
                                                        
34 See, for example, Cudworth and Hobden, ‘Of Parts and Wholes’ 2013, pp. 438-9, p. 443. 
On  
35 Curthoys and Docker, ‘Defining Genocide,’ p. 28. Emphasis added.  
36 Tony Barta, ‘Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonisation of Australia,’ in 
Walliman and Dobkowski (eds.), Genocide and the Modern Age, 2nd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2000), pp. 237–252. 
37 Tony Barta, ‘With intent to deny: on colonial intentions and genocide denial,’ Journal of 
Genocide Research, 10(1), 2008, p. 115. 
38 Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,’ Journal of Genocide 
Research, 2006, 8(4), pp. 387-409. 
39  Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and Ecocide 
(London: Zed Books, 2016), p. 161. See also Mark Levene and Daniele Conversi, who argue 
neoliberal globalization and concomitant processes of nation-state building amount to a 
‘structural genocide’ against subsistence societies: ‘Subsistence societies globalisation, 
climate change and genocide: discourses of vulnerability and resilience,’ International 
Journal of Human Rights, 18(3), 2014, pp. 281-297.    
40 For a good overview of recent thought around these ideas, see, for example: Michele Acuto 
and Simon Curtis (eds.), Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010). 
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are not empirically addressed in this article, the limited aim of this brief discussion is 
to highlight how the focus on social death might fit into and assist the development of 
a more holistic theoretical approach to genocide that decenters a simplistic notion of 
intent.41 
 
An assault on being: a relational conceptualisation of social death 
Returning to Card, a number of potential problems with her account of social death 
can be identified. For example, as noted, her discussion is centred on social death as a 
condition experienced by individuals (albeit in virtue of their group membership). Her 
account, thus, could also be said to represent a state or an outcome for an individual. 
However, representing social death in this way may limit our ability to identify 
imminent, or actually occurring genocide until after the fact.42 Arguably therefore, 
Card does not give sufficient attention to social death as a process that develops, 
unfolds, or takes root over time.   
Further, it seems the relationship between social vitality on the one hand, and 
social death on the other, needs further clarification. If it is social vitality that 
genocide destroys, and the destruction of a group’s social vitality can lead an 
individual to a condition of social death, arguably this should prompt us to think more 
deeply about the nature or ontology of the ‘self’: what is it about individuals such that 
they are susceptible to the condition of social death following extreme destruction of 
social vitality, or (as some interviewees in this study described) to the experience life 
as a kind of 'living death'? Considering these questions, we see Card’s reduction to the 
individual becomes problematic, even on her own terms. Whilst processual and 
relational elements are indeed present in Card’s writings, they could be more fully 
emphasized and developed. 
A relational interpretation of social death, I suggest, facilitates a conceptual 
move beyond Card’s focus on individual harm, without reducing the object of this 
harm to groups. Indeed, arguably the very possibility of social death as Card describes 
it presupposes the relational structure and intersubjective constitution of an 
                                                        
41  For interesting discussions on the issue of intent in relation to genocide see: ‘Three 
Responses to “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide?” Journal of 
Genocide Research, 10(1), 2008, pp. 111-133; Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual blockages and 
definitional dilemmas in the “racial century”: genocides of indigenous peoples and the 
Holocaust,’ Patterns of Prejudice, 36(4), 2002, pp. 7-36.  
42 Thanks to Martin Shaw for raising this point. 
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individual’s being and identity. Highlighting this helps us see the external, relational 
and collective ‘correlates’ of the subjective, individual, experience of genocidal social 
death, and therefore the potential for an expanded understanding of the concept that 
bridges the opposition between collective and individual harms. For example, Abed 
writes: 
 
When a culture imprints itself on almost every area of an individual’s life, 
the individual is influenced in profound and far-reaching ways. 
Developing as a person in the midst of or in close proximity to such a 
group means internalizing its narratives, rituals, practices, and norms. This 
experience does much more than shape the inner life of an individual. 
Belonging gives a person a sense of security and orientation in an 
otherwise confusing world; it sustains the unity and coherence of the self 
rather than being a mere aspect of it.43  
 
In a line of argument similar to that proposed here, Lisa Guenther, in her examination 
of the consequences of solitary confinement, describes a suffering that 'blurs the 
distinction between life and death.' She asks: 'what must subjectivity be like in order 
for this to be possible? Who are we, such that we can be unhinged from ourselves by 
being separated from others?' This notion of 'becoming unhinged,' she writes, is not 
simply a 'colloquial expression,' but rather a ‘precise description of what happens 
when the articulated joints of our embodied, interrelational subjectivity are broken 
apart.' In Guenther’s view, a 'sense of concrete personhood relies essentially upon 
embodied relations to other embodied consciousnesses in a shared world. [...] The 
sense of the world is co-constituted with others.'44
 
Therefore, Guenther argues, the 
punishment of solitary confinement 'threatens to undermine the identity of the 
subject.' The harm inflicted by the practice is ‘ontological; it violates the very 
structure of our relational being.’45 Genocidal social death may similarly be described 
as ontological, as a deep rupture of the relational structure of an individual’s being or 
personhood.   
                                                        
43 Ibid, p. 317. Emphasis added. 
44  Guenther, L., Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its Afterlives, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013), p. 1, p. 4. Emphasis added. 
45 Guenther, L., ‘The Living Death of Solitary Confinement,' New York Times, 26 August 
2012.  
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Powell’s discussion of the relational sociology of Norbert Elias – in particular 
his concept of a ‘figuration’ – provides a complementary theoretical dimension to 
these ideas. Elias emphasised that individuals do not exist prior to social relations, and 
that individual and collective identity depend upon one another. Summarizing, Powell 
writes, ‘Individuals form their personal subjectivity through relations with others in a 
definite social context, and identification with others is a crucial part of this process. 
[…] Only in relation to a collective self is it possible for me to be my individual self.’ 
To destroy a collective identity, therefore, ‘is to violently destroy a crucial part of the 
individual self.’46 According to Powell therefore, the object that genocide destroys is 
a ‘figuration’: a ‘dynamic social network that sustains a collective identity.’ 47 
Drawing on Elias, he writes:  
 
Our very subjectivity is formed out of the practical and taken-for-granted 
set of skills, attitudes, understandings by which each of us conducts our 
life, and these develop only through our relationships with each other. The 
essential human condition is not being, but being with others.48 
 
This notion of ‘being with others’ is significant here. For Jean-Luc Nancy, the 
conditions of ‘being-together’ amount to what he describes as a ‘world.’ All beings, 
he argues, although singular, are also irreducibly plural because they are co-
constituted by other beings.49 It is therefore insufficient, in his view, to understand 
genocide simply as an attack on or loss of people per se; it is, rather, a destruction of 
the conditions of being together - ‘the putting to death of the [or ‘a’] world.’50 Indeed, 
Card’s characterization of ‘social vitality’ could be seen as a synonymous description 
of what Nancy terms a ‘world’, and Elias a ‘figuration’ constituting a ‘collective 
social identity.’ This notion of the loss of a ‘world’ can powerfully expand our grasp 
of the meaning of social death at an experiential level, and help us appreciate the 
profound sense in which individuals may be left unmoored and dislocated from the 
world, even when having physically survived genocide.   
                                                        
46 Powell, 'What do Genocides Kill?’ p. 537. 
47 Powell, Barbaric Civilisation, p. 9. 
48 Powell, 'What do Genocides Kill?’ p. 537. Emphasis added. 
49 As summarised by Mitchell, A., ‘Only human? A worldly approach to security,’ Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 45(1), pp. 5-21, p. 7. 
50 Cited in Mitchell, ‘Only human?’ p. 7. 
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It is arguably this very experience that philosopher Jonathan Lear captures so 
vividly in his discussion of the destruction of the Crow nation in Montana in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. He quotes the Crow chief, Plenty Coups, talking about 
what happened after the nation was confined to a reservation: ‘But when the buffalo 
went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up 
again. After this nothing happened.’51 Lear interrogates this extraordinary and, as he 
describes, enigmatic last phrase. We can begin to make sense of what it might mean 
for a group, in the face of cultural devastation, to experience ‘nothing happening’ if 
we understand that the Crow have ‘lost the concepts with which they would construct 
a narrative.’ This loss, in Lear’s view, amounts to the ‘real loss of a point of view’; 
the breaking down of a ‘conceptual world.’52 It is a loss that is not a ‘happening’ as 
such, but rather the ‘breakdown of that in terms of which happenings occur.’53 In 
articulating this loss, we illuminate also what Lear describes as an ‘ontological 
vulnerability that affects us all insofar as we are human.’54  
Drawing these ideas together, the core point emphasized here is that social 
death cannot be reduced to either the individual or the collective level. In recognizing 
individuals and the ‘worlds’ within which they are embedded as ontologically co-
constitutive, we are able to understand the inherent connection between the individual 
and collective dimensions of the harm of genocide. In short, a relational 
understanding of the self demonstrates how the destruction of what Card describes as 
‘social vitality’ can also amount to destruction of the very possibility of a way of 
being in the world, and thus also the meaningful possibility of – or the unity and 
coherence of – personhood itself. 
 
A flexible definitional approach 
The harm-based conceptualization outlined here may help provide the basis for a 
flexible definitional approach to genocide. A flexible approach – one that avoids ideas 
of there being a universal, timeless form of genocide – is important for a number of 
reasons. Henry Theriault has cogently argued that because genocide is a shifting 
social construct, rather than a fixed natural object, we need a flexible approach to 
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definition in order to adjust to the various ‘mutations’ in forms and methods of 
genocide, and in order to be sensitive to unique contexts and the changing nature of 
political violence.55 This, one would expect, should also extend to the contingent 
character of the ideological constructs, justifications and rationalizations constitutive 
of perpetrators’ genocidal subjectivities. Moreover, Theriault also highlights the 
problem of ‘anticipatory denial’: ‘as relevant laws, legal interpretation, and political 
commitments develop, so do would-be perpetrators modify what genocide is in order 
to avoid political and legal consequences.’56   
Conceptually centering social death implicitly builds in definitional flexibility, 
for what it means for a particular group or individual to suffer social death, as well as 
the means and methods by which it is inflicted, could vary greatly depending on the 
group and context, the nature of which need not be predetermined. Moreover, Abed’s 
delineation of the features which make a group susceptible to social death, described 
above, provides a set of guiding parameters that obviates the need for a fixed list of 
the types of groups that can be victims of genocide.  
Relatedly, the concept of social death may have a particular capacity to 
function effectively in this way because it could provide a basis for a shift in what 
Thaler describes as the ‘perceptive and interpretive frameworks’ through which acts 
of violence are ‘read’ and ‘morally filtered,’ forcing us to grasp the gravity of certain 
acts and situations in a new light. The inability to recognize new forms of genocidal 
violence as genocide derives, according to Thaler, from a ‘deficiency in imaginative 
powers.’ Social death could help engage an empathetic and collective ‘political 
imagination’ by offering a tangible narrative of human suffering.57 It provides a lens 
though which we may disrupt hegemonic representations of genocide as mass killing, 
and ‘cultivate, and continue cultivating, the faculty to envisage’ diverse instances 
violence (such as rape or anthropogenic climate change) and unpredictable 
methodological ‘innovations’ by perpetrators as ‘subsumable under the rubric of 
genocide.’58 Social death can thus function as a flexible conceptual anchor, potentially 
providing a degree of protection against ‘anticipatory denial.’  
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Centring social death in the way that has been suggested here enables us to 
remain open but grounded; alert to the potential multiple and contingent 
manifestations and futures of genocide, but attuned above all to that which is surely 
most important: the consequences for victims. 59  Focusing precisely on this, the 
following sections will bring the preceding theoretical discussion to life through the 
experiences of victims/survivors from the genocide-affected regions of Darfur and the 
Nuba Mountains in Sudan. The lens of social death, it will be seen, provides a 
valuable conceptual vocabulary with which to illuminate and make sense of their 
experiences. 
 
Loss of identity: a social and cultural assault 
Whilst horrific accounts of physical violence, torture and killings were frequently 
recounted by interviewees for this study, it was nevertheless the social, cultural, and 
identity-based aspects of destruction that tended to be at the centre of their narratives 
and experiences of loss, pain and harm. In a significant sense, therefore, a focus on 
the physical alone is unable to capture the depth, range or dimensions of the harm 
experienced. The majority of interviewees made clear they did not experience (often 
harrowing) violence targeted at their communities and villages in straightforwardly 
physical terms; they did not regard it as exclusively an attempt to physically destroy 
or remove them. Rather, they experienced it, acutely, as an attack on their culture, 
way of life, their identity, and even their humanity. As one man from Darfur 
commented, ‘You are not a human being just by eating and drinking. The [genocidal] 
assault is not just on the body.’60    
Within the context of two bloody civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005), 
genocide has unfolded across Sudan’s peripheries over several decades, revealing an 
historical pattern that has emerged within a shifting social, political, economic, and 
international context.61 In southern Sudan, the Nilotic-speaking peoples, including the 
Dinka, Nuer, Atuot and Shilluk were targeted, particularly from the late 1970s62; in 
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the Nuba Mountains, especially in the early 1990s, it was the ethnically diverse Nuba 
peoples, targeted again from 201163; and in Darfur, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit 
tribes were attacked, with violence preceding but peaking from 2003. 64  Similar 
patterns of destruction have also been perpetrated against the Beja in the east of 
Sudan. The destruction experienced by these peoples has displayed similar methods 
and practices of violence, including: the co-option of tribal militias and joint militia-
army attacks; man made famine (often enacted through militia looting) and 
obstruction of humanitarian aid; mass rape and sexual violence; destruction of 
livelihoods, farmland, poisoning of wells, and looting; the targeting and execution of 
social, cultural, and political leadership; massive forced displacement; massacres, and 
‘scorched earth’ tactics, including the burning and complete destruction of hundreds 
of villages and cultural symbols. Each of these peoples has also suffered various 
manifestations and intensities of enforced cultural assimilation and destruction in the 
form of, sometimes violently enforced, Arabisation and Islamisation, most 
aggressively in the so-called ‘peace camps’ in the Nuba Mountains in the early 1990s.   
When asked generally about the most significant losses and harms experienced, 
many interviewees spontaneously and explicitly described their experiences in terms 
of a loss of identity, demonstrating a striking congruence with Card’s interpretation of 
genocide’s distinctive harm. A woman from Darfur stated clearly: ‘I feel I have lost 
my identity.’65 And a man from the Nuba Mountains commented:  
 
Physical destruction is certainly something that is being pursued with 
                                                                                                                                                              
Rights, (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2003); John Burton, ‘Development and 
Cultural Genocide in the Sudan,’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29(3), September 
1991. 
63 Rahhal, The Right to be Nuba: The Story of a Sudanese People’s Struggle for Survival 
(Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2001); Samuel Totten, Genocide by Attrition: The Nuba 
Mountains of Sudan (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2012); Alex de Waal, ‘Not 
Forgetting the Nuba War,’ African Arguments, 9 August 2008. Available at: 
http://africanarguments.org/2008/08/09/truth-telling-nuba/. 
64 Samuel Totten, ‘Genocide in Darfur, Sudan,’ in Samuel Totten and William Parsons (eds.), 
Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts 4th ed., (New York: Routledge, 
2013); Eric Reeves, A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide (Toronto: 
The Key Publishing House, 2007); Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleaning 
by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 
May 2004); Amnesty International, The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in Darfur, Sudan 
(London: Amnesty International, 2004); John Heffernan and Jennifer Leaning, Darfur – 
Assault on Survival: A Call for Security, Justice, and Restitution, (Cambridge MA: Physicians 
for Human Rights, 2006). 
65 Interview 4. 
 17 
different intensities at different times. But I think, what is being destroyed 
at heart, [...] when you destroy someone physically, you are not just 
destroying that person, but you are inflicting a deeper kind of, I would call 
it, pain, defeat, destruction, that is psychological and extends to the rest of 
society. It is destruction of the social fabric as well - a way of living, 
culture. It is destruction of, if you like, the collective spirit of a group. If 
you are culturally oppressed, and you grew up as a child in this 
environment, what outlook will you have on yourself? You would have a 
slave mentality. Looking at yourself, you are ashamed of who you are, and 
that, I think, is even more sinister.66  
 
Echoing the views of many others, this individual perceived genocide as an attack on 
the ‘way of life’, ‘collective spirit’, and ‘social fabric of the group.’ Attacks were 
experienced as inflicting not just physical wounds, but also psychological wounds; 
‘pain’, ‘defeat’, and ‘destruction’ extended to the whole of society. In the passage 
above, the physical and the social/cultural appear to bleed into one, undifferentiated 
assault that has unfolded over time. This theme was a recurring one. A man from 
Darfur commented: ‘They want to destroy your way of life. To erase you, actually.’67 
Another man from the Nuba Mountains told me that the social fabric and rich culture 
that once existed in the region ‘is gone, it will never be like before.’68  
 As already noted, for Card, a loss of context and identity that provides 
meaning and shape to an individual’s life is at the heart of the experience of social 
death. When asked more specifically about the relationship between the 
social/cultural dimensions of the assaults and the physical, violent dimensions, one 
interviewee responded: 
 
Identity is the origin of the human, the person. They have to know their 
roots and their culture and language. But physical attack, you can attack 
and be killed. But if your identity is finished, that means you are nothing, 
because you don't have an identity, don't know who you are, you don’t 
know which tribe/ancestors. This is what they did, and this is a very sad 
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thing.69  
 
Another man from the Nuba Mountains, when asked a similar question, responded: 
 
I am from the Nuba Mountains. If they attack me, force me to change my 
name [...] give me a name that does not belong to me. If they change my 
language. If they change my ways of life. If they take my land. That’s like 
they take my life, my whole life. [I feel a bit] dead anyway. I feel like that. 
It could be better to die.70  
 
These passages draw attention to the ongoing harm of genocide, the effects that 
continue long after any extreme violent outbursts have subsided, or victims have 
reached safety. Whilst many individuals interviewed were able to reclaim and 
‘revitalise’ their sense of identity and community connections in the diaspora (further 
discussed below), many others were not. Several spoke of feeling ‘lost’ and 
‘uprooted.’71 One man from Darfur told me that the biggest loss he had experienced 
personally was the ‘loss of social connection’ with the community in his former 
homeland.72 And a man from the Nuba Mountains, living in London, explained: 
 
I just feel like I’m just living. I’m just here, just feel like mechanical. I just 
feel like the rest of my life is just duties and I’m just like a machine, 
mechanical. I don’t feel it, the type or way of life here. I don’t feel the way 
that your life is, and everywhere, I’m not attached to it psychologically, to 
anywhere. [...] The way I feel is that my life has become tasteless.73  
 
This person felt this way despite being part of the fairly large and cohesive diaspora 
community in the UK. Indeed, he was well connected in the community, active in 
human rights work, and had a professional career in medicine. Despite the large 
diaspora community, however, he said he was not able to properly practice his 
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culture, in particular the regular gatherings and festivals so central to his community 
in the Nuba Mountains: ‘I don’t feel any kind of enjoyment with any other such life. 
[...] This is my life, my joy, my everything.’ For this individual, any form of ‘social 
vitality’ he was able to recover or recreate was severely impoverished compared with 
what was lost.74 A life that is ‘tasteless,’ as this man candidly put it, is arguably akin 
to a form of meaninglessness. Major loss of social vitality, Card writes, ‘often robs 
one even of the ability to give meaning to one’s life, thereby destroying a fundamental 
aspect of one’s humanity.’75  
 
 
Loss of Language 
Importantly related to the experience of identity loss was the theme of language loss, 
the significance of which came up repeatedly in interviews, and was perceived as 
being part of a broader assault on communities and their distinctive identities. The 
genocide, as one individual noted, ‘came little by little. First they try to change your 
language.’76  When asked generally to describe what had been some of the most 
significant losses experienced, both individually and for the community as a whole, 
many interviewees spoke of how their tribal languages have, over time, been 
demeaned, attacked, weakened and diminished.77 A man from the Nuba Mountains 
commented that the attack on language was an ‘attack on our identity.' Even though 
the community in the diaspora made efforts to keep it alive with small classes for their 
children, he feared his language, Kadugli, would soon be lost.78   
The suppression and degradation of tribal languages was frequently described 
in terms of an attack on the very foundations of community and the ties that held it 
together. Many interviewees also talked of how their tribal languages had become 
synonymous with backwardness. In this context, many referred to the Arabic word 
rotana, a pejorative term used by school teachers (who often came from Khartoum) 
and broader society in the north to describe African tribal languages. Interviewees 
understood this term to mean ‘animal language.’ They were told that their language 
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was not a ‘real’ language, but rotana:  
 
They try to destroy all these local, traditional things. [...] If you speak your 
own [tribal language] the people look down at you. I feel like they are 
trying to shut me down. This is my tradition. This is the problem of Sudan, 
it is an identity problem. They don’t even let you say the word ‘language’ 
to refer to traditional tribal language. They say ‘this is not a language, this 
is rotana,’ which is like the animal talk. They try to make you feel you are 
not even human, you are an animal.79 
 
Emphasising the centrality of language to culture and identity more generally, many 
referred to their tribal languages as not simply a means of communication, but as 
fundamentally connecting them to their tribe or ethnic group. 80
 
Some, indeed, 
described it as the 'carrier' of their distinctive culture, and thus experienced the loss of 
language as a form of being ‘uprooted’ and disconnected from their community, 
traditions, and history. As one woman from Darfur said, ‘if you can’t speak your 
language, that means you have no ties to that ethnicity or tribe. You are cut off from 
your roots, you are uprooted.’81   
 
Generational loss 
Loss of language was also discussed in the context of deep concern about the future, 
and fears that the interviewees’ distinctive cultures would eventually die as future 
generations would be unable to fully absorb and meaningfully ‘live’ traditions and 
languages. Indeed, intersecting with the broader theme of identity loss, the issue of 
generational loss emerged as a significant theme in its own right. Whilst not initially 
anticipated when conducting interviews (and as such direct questions about it were 
not asked), thoughts and fears about generational loss came up spontaneously and 
frequently. Card sees generational loss as an important element of the overall 
experience of social death: 
 
When a group with its own cultural identity is destroyed, its survivors lose 
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their cultural heritage and may even lose their intergenerational 
connections […] in that event they may become “socially dead” and their 
descendants “natally alienated,” no longer able to pass along and build on 
the traditions, cultural developments (including languages) and projects of 
earlier generations.82 
 
Genocide, she further writes, ‘robs groups of descendants.’83 According to Powell, 
'We may count among the means by which genocide may be committed the measures 
that interrupt the reproduction of the figuration over time.’84
 
The passing on of culture 
to children is a fundamental dimension of such a process.  
In the context of speaking about her own sense of lost identity, one woman from 
Darfur, now living in London, commented that she and many others in the diaspora 
describe their children (often born outside of Sudan) as 'those who have the lost 
identity':  
 
We [worry] about our children, those who have been born here and grown 
up here. We call them those who have the lost identity. We use this phrase. 
We lost our identity. We lost our identity. We cannot identify ourselves as 
normal Sudanese citizens, and now here, we have lost our identity and our 
children will lose their identity as well. We cannot go back to Sudan, and 
if we did we have our history destroyed, everything. Everything is 
finished, everything is destroyed, I can’t take my children back to show 
them where I grew up, where they are from. Even if there is peace, and 
there is reconstruction... we need a museum or a memorial. [T]he places 
have been destroyed, the villages everything has been burned. For me, I 
feel different, I feel I have lost my identity. But for my children, on top of 
this loss of identity, they are going to be confused. Who am I? Where do I 
belong? England? Darfur, the lost area? Sudan? 85
 
 
 
Many spoke of children’s disconnection from their cultural heritage, and were deeply 
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saddened by the fact that children born outside of Darfur or the Nuba Mountains 
would struggle with attachment to their traditional culture. Most individuals I spoke to 
experienced their children’s disconnection from their cultural heritage as a significant 
personal loss.   
The issue of generational loss was frequently discussed in the context of the 
massive (and multiple) forced displacements of targeted communities, and the horrific 
conditions of the camps they have been forced to live in. It has been over 16 years 
since the violent outburst of 2003 in Darfur. Many children have now grown up in 
refugee and IDP camps, and many babies have been born there. Interviewees 
described the young people in the camps as confused, angry, and increasingly violent 
and militarized.86
 
Some talked of a ‘damaged’ or ‘lost’ generation in the camps.87
 
Several interviewees also talked about the destructive consequences for society as a 
whole as a result of the situation of younger generations. In particular, many people 
were deeply worried about the long-term consequences of a pervasive lack of 
education for the future of their communities.88
   
Also of great concern was the loss of practical knowledge, such as farming. 
Younger generations, some said, will not know how to maintain the patterns and 
structures of society, and they would not be able to contribute culturally or 
economically to its development and advancement into the future.89
 
The younger 
generations of the camps, one person told me, are 'hopeless,' unable to contribute to 
society, with no knowledge of their communities’ traditions of livelihood. One man 
from Darfur told me young people in the camps are also increasingly susceptible to 
becoming involved in crime, alcoholism, and drugs: 'These people are a danger to 
their families. [...] We have lost a generation.' The poor conditions in the camps, this 
man continued, are making the 'kids more aggressive.' He also saw these issues in 
terms of Khartoum’s long-term strategy: 'To disconnect a generation from [their] 
identity is better for the government. They [young people] are alienated from the 
culture. The government has won.’90
 
Another interviewee commented:  
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The social connection we used to have when we grew up is no longer 
there. And what do you expect from someone growing up in a shanty 
town? No proper water, sanitation. It is just a box, someone who grew up 
in a box. He will come out anti-social, he hates everyone, including 
himself.91 
 
Another man from Darfur told me that the children who have grown up in the camps 
'look like they are from a different continent, like they are from a different world.' 
These children, he said, 'feel like they don’t deserve anything.’ 92  A number of 
individuals also told me that the government covertly facilitates drugs and alcohol 
into the camps, with the aim of worsening conditions and morale in the camps.93
 
I was 
also told that increasing numbers of girls are becoming involved in prostitution.94   
Resonating with Patterson’s notion of ‘natal alienation,’ one man from Darfur, 
speaking of the generation that has known only the camps, said: 
 
If you speak about someone who was born as a result of rape, does not 
know who her/his parents are, someone who comes from a culture that no 
one anymore knows anything about [...] When you lose your parents, 
family, your community, your culture, your way of life, suddenly you find 
yourself as if you are alone in this world. This is the equivalent to death. 
You may come to the conclusion that it is better for you to die.95  
 
Focusing in on this issue of generational loss, and the camps in particular as sites 
which facilitate — and at the same time conceal — this process of societal 
fragmentation, can help us see how the camps themselves, often constructed as safe 
‘humanitarian’ spaces, are implicated in a wider network of destructive processes.  
Rape and enforced pregnancy 
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Systematic mass rape has been well documented in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains.96 
Sexual violence and enforced pregnancy have massive physical, psychological and 
societal impacts, leaving victims ‘physically traumatised, shamed, and ostracised.’97 
In Sudan, pervasive cultural norms mean that women and girls who have been victims 
of rape are no longer marriageable. They are stigmatised and pushed out of their 
families and communities, perceived to bring shame on both. Enforced pregnancy has 
also been an insidious and pervasive aspect of the conflict, with women and girls held 
captive until abortion was no longer safe.   
A large proportion of those interviewed for this study, both men and women, 
regarded rape and sexual violence as the most harmful and destructive of all the 
various aspects of the attacks, even more so, many stressed, than killings. Rape, 
interviewees communicated, fractures, humiliates, dehumanises, traumatises, and 
demoralises individuals, families, and whole communities.98 Indeed, research in 2004 
documented that victims of rape in Darfur felt the tactic represented a ‘systematic 
campaign to humiliate the women, their husbands and fathers, and to weaken tribal 
ethnic lines.’99
  
A significant point communicated by several individuals interviewed for this 
study was that the issue of rape should not be viewed as an ‘add-on,’ or something to 
be considered in addition to the ‘main’ violence of genocide or the overall conflict. 
Rather, both men and women saw mass rape and sexual violence not only as the worst 
thing that has happened to their communities, but also as representative or symbolic 
of the overall assault - its character, the harm it has produced, its purpose, and the 
meaning it holds for them as its targets and victims:  
 
Targeting women for rape is one of the most destructive elements for the 
community I can see. [...] A shortfall of other accounts of genocide is that 
they don’t talk about its impact on women properly, but this is a huge 
thing. It’s just like something that is added on at the end, a sentence. But 
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women are part of every family, they are fifty percent. We are making a 
big mistake by being dismissive of a very important part. There is no 
information about the numbers of rapes, but if we knew the numbers, we 
could imagine the magnitude of the crisis.100  
 
Many people have been killed for different issues. [If someone dies] life 
goes on. Rape is there, it will never leave you. [...] It will destroy you over 
and over everyday. This is something people can’t live with. Many end up 
committing suicide. They do bad things to other people. It’s the 
destruction of society.101  
 
The concept of ‘genocidal rape’ has emerged more prominently in an international 
legal context over the last two decades, particularly in the aftermath of Rwanda and 
Bosnia. Some argue that rape should be added to the UN Genocide Convention as a 
separate act. 102
 
Others believe that it is already included under Article 2 of the 
Convention, even if not explicitly stated, encompassed under the infliction of serious 
bodily or mental harm.103 The jurisprudence on this issue tends to fall back on the 
claim that rape, like the other acts enumerated in the UN Convention on Genocide, 
can ‘destroy a group,’ and constitutes a genocidal act if the requisite ‘intent’ is 
present. But the question of what it means exactly to ‘destroy a group’ is left 
unanswered. What makes rape genocidal? Why would aggressors choose to commit 
rape rather than murdering their victims?    
The comments of interviewees suggested that mass rape inflicts multiple harms, 
consistent with an understanding of genocide as social death. In addition to the 
common description of mass rape as the most painful and destructive dimension of 
the overall assault, many also described it as ‘worse than death.’ It was common for 
women to state that it was preferable to be killed after having been raped, rather than 
to live with the consequences. Some spoke of victims begging their aggressors to 
murder them:  
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People who are dead, there is peace. It [death] is a wartime fact that people 
can find a way of dealing with even if they have grievances, or want 
justice. People can find a way of dealing with it. It’s not about humiliating 
someone and letting them live in pain. […] Rape is the worst that can 
happen. I may not find the appropriate words to describe it, but it is huge.  
 
The impact of death can generate a positive response, but rape creates a 
whole situation of damage after damage. You do not just experience one 
damage. It’s the physical harm, psychological harm, and then also the 
social harm of being disconnected, the harm of rejection [of women and 
girls raped]. Its consequences affect other people, the husband, family, 
children, the issue of HIV. And then the whole family is isolated because 
of the shame. So it will go on and on and on and continue like this until 
there is a conscious intervention.104  
 
Such responses, however, particularly the notion that it is better to die than to be 
raped, should be contextualized in relation to the patriarchal social dynamics and 
hierarchies that structure communal responses to rape within targeted communities in 
Sudan. In fact, several interviewees, both men and women, spoke frankly of the 
aspect of their culture that stigmatizes and ostracizes rape victims as deeply negative 
and destructive, and something that should be subject to concerted intervention 
directed particularly at men. Some suggested it was knowledge of this aspect of their 
culture that motivated mass rapes; consciously exploiting these cultural norms, the 
perpetrators knew rape would rip communities apart.105   
Nevertheless, in light of the frequency of assertions in the testimony collected to 
the effect that rape and its consequences are ‘worse than death,’ we are compelled to 
take seriously (as Card does) the idea that social death may be worse than physical 
death, and to ask afresh the question of why genocide, and specifically genocidal 
rape, can bring about such an experience. Considering the mass rape in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Card writes:  
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They left many female survivors little more than gestating corpses, social 
outcasts, unmarriageable, their offspring unassimilable. What had those 
survivors to look forward to other than life-long post-traumatic stress? 
Would their fate have been worse had they been killed?106  
 
Women and girls who have been victims of rape and in some cases made pregnant 
through rape, may become ‘socially dead’ insofar as they are deemed to have lost 
‘value,’ or are seen to be ‘valueless,’ by the broader society. Such women are often 
rejected from the community, and thus completely dislocated from the unified social 
context upon which their individual identities depended.    
Interviewees furthermore noted that the shame and humiliation associated with 
rape was not just experienced at an individual level, but was also particularly acute at 
the level of the community, compounding social fragmentation and widespread 
demoralization. As Card writes, 'Rape humiliates. Public, unremitting, irreparable, 
deep humiliation is among the techniques of genocide.'107 Mass rape in this way can 
erode community bonds of trust. It also disrupts the processes by which a social 
collectivity reproduces itself and maintains its social vitality over time by impeding 
the formation of future families, and traumatizing families that do form.108  
Many interviewees also talked about how, in their societies, women were 
symbolic of the ‘heart’ or the ‘core’ of the community. Thus, to attack and degrade 
women in this way was also to attack the very foundation or core of the community as 
a whole. Its humiliating effects, the physical and psychological 'torture' it inflicts, and 
the way it exerts 'control over the future of communities by tampering with the 
production of the next generation,' are all ways in which genocidal rape forms part of 
a broader assault 'that has the clearly foreseeable consequence, if not also the explicit 
aim, of destroying vitality in a people.' 109  Systematic rape can fragment and 
demoralize societies to such an extent that they lose the collective will to resist or 
fight back: 'Vitality destroyed in order to destroy a people’s will to fight [...] can also 
destroy that people.'110 
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Forced displacement  
In terrorizing whole communities in to flight, mass rape has been a central factor in 
the massive displacement of targeted civilians in Sudan. In Darfur, over 2.5 million 
have been internally displaced.111 There are also almost 400,000 Darfuri refugees in 
eastern Chad. 112  In the Nuba Mountains, especially during the 1990s violent 
displacements forced huge numbers into what were effectively concentration camps 
(the ‘peace camps’). Since violence broke out in the region again in 2011, hundreds of 
thousands, facing government attacks, starvation and aerial bombardment, have been 
displaced from the region.113 Those living in the diaspora in the UK and US, whilst 
expressing a deep sense of loss and pain in being pushed from their homeland, 
nevertheless tended to highlight their relative safety, freedom, and ability to move 
around and express their culture freely, albeit it in a limited and diminished form. 
However, this could not be said for those displaced and forced to live in camps; in a 
very real sense, people in the IDP and refugee camps, as well as the urban slums 
around Khartoum, simply do not have a ‘place to be.’  
Card does not explicitly deal with the particular harms associated with 
displacement and the loss of land. However, it is consistent with her broader 
formulation of social death. Particularly for rural, subsistence societies, such as those 
from Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, land is a vital constitutive dimension of culture 
and identity. Abed’s notion of a ‘territorially bounded culture’ is relevant and 
illuminating here. The forced removal of a population with such a culture from their 
traditional lands, he writes, will almost certainly eventuate in social death.114     
Komey discusses this issue using the concept of ‘region,’ which for him 
describes ‘not a mere geographical space but a societal set-up full of political, 
ideological, socio-cultural and economic dynamic realities.’ 115  For indigenous 
peoples, as Williams and Smith write, ‘region’ is: 
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[A] source of identity and self-sustaining resources; it is an historic 
territory, a homeland, a rightful possession of one’s forefathers through 
generations. It is distinctive and a unique territory; and the identity of the 
nation is bound up with memory, and this memory is rooted in a 
homeland.116 
 
In Sudan, according to Komey, the term ‘region’ has ‘emerged as a self-identifying 
concept that serves as a focus of cultural, economic, religious, political and historical 
identities.’ Land is not simply a material resource-base, but is ‘essentially a human 
world replete with meaning and symbols as an ethnic/tribal identity, social interaction 
and livelihood.’117 A number of authors have observed that indigenous peoples tend to 
'define themselves principally through their relationship to land.’118
 
Patrick Wolfe 
writes that for such communities,  
 
[L]and is life — or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests for 
land can be — indeed, often are — contests for life. [...] So far as 
Indigenous people are concerned, where they are is who they are.119 
Indeed, a man from the Nuba Mountains commented:  
 
The land is life, the land is your life. Because we depend on this land. We 
farm this land, we collect the fire wood from this land. We collect fruit 
from this land. This is my life in the land. If someone takes your land, he 
takes your life. If you have lost your land, you have lost everything.120  
 
For those displaced from their regions in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, eking out 
an existence in the overcrowded and increasingly dysfunctional camps, possibilities 
for maintaining social bonds, community relationships and cultural practices are 
severely impoverished. As many interviewees stated, most living in the camps are 
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concerned primarily with survival.121  This was particularly the case for camps in 
Darfur and Chad. One woman from Darfur commented that in the camps, 'The unified 
social context that connects people together does not exist now.'122 The camps were 
described as ‘prisons' by several interviewees:  
 
...[there is] no work, nothing to do, no education, just waiting for food. 
Your self is going to change. This has happened. When [people] leave 
[they] won’t know how to live. They [the camps] are big prisons. This will 
change your psychology, mentality, attitude.123  
Meaningful cultural and social relationships, bonds, and traditions require ongoing 
practices and activities to keep them ‘alive.’ But as Card writes, 'genocidal plans 
prohibit or make impossible' such activities, 'typically in an escalating fashion, until 
little if any social activity remains.’124
 
Thus we see how the trauma and upheaval of 
mass displacement, and life confined to insecure and impoverished camps, can 
function as part of a process of genocidal destruction, rather then ‘merely’ ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’125  
Traumatically uprooted from their lands and livelihoods, the inherently 
interwoven connection between physical space and community identity has been 
violently disrupted, and the ‘intimate social structures’ that bound people together, 
dependent on this connection, have as a consequence been ‘obliterated.’126  Many 
interviewees highlighted the loss of culture and disintegration of social connection 
that has occurred in the camps: 
 
When the culture is on hold for [so long], that culture is lost, because 
nobody can embrace that culture. When people disappear and move to 
different places, or live in new cultures, their original culture is on hold. 
[...] After so long, this culture is lost. People have lost their culture. People 
have lost their interrelations, have lost their land, have lost relations, 
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family, their friends [...] then what is left to be lost? Nothing.127
  
 
As a consequence of these losses, the people in the camps in Darfur and Chad were 
described as simply existing, rather than living.128
 
Another person stated:  
 
When you are displaced you have already lost the culture. You are not able 
to practice the culture as you want. Especially in the camps. People [are just 
trying] to get something to eat. All people in the camps can think about is 
survival. You are not able to think about culture.’129 
 
Some spoke about how elderly people are ‘lost’ in the camps, and suffer particularly 
badly without the skills to cope with the new environment. Farming was all many 
knew in terms of maintaining a livelihood, and this practice was central to their 
identity and connectedness to the community. Forced from their land and traditional 
patterns of life, they have become passive and dependent. 130
 
Further, for the 
communities in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, travel to other parts of Sudan and 
especially outside it, is not customary. People have thus been forced to flee 
homesteads that have belonged to their families for generations, and the villages and 
lands they have lived in since they were born, and in which they expected to die.131
 
Indeed, Card also sees the experience of social death as involving the deprivation of 
meaningful deaths.132
  
Livelihood practices were a linchpin of societal and cultural cohesion. In the 
Nuba Mountains, for example, most are farmers, and communities work collectively 
on the land: 'Everybody has obligation to help somebody. The people do together. 
Any work is done as a group.' Each tribe also has its own area of land.133 A man from 
the Nuba Mountains, in the context of discussing the issue of livelihood and 
communities’ collective sense of responsibility, also talked about the respect among 
people. The government, he says, 'tries to break this, [respect] the people’s unity':  
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If the people of the Nuba Mountains, all of them are united, and they live in 
one area in peace, it is difficult [for the government] to change them. That’s 
what they make this war to do. [...] They want to break the people.134   
 
Particular features of the local ecology and geography are also deeply embedded in 
cultural narratives, rituals, and identities. Distinctive patterns of collective social life 
are arranged around and dependent upon the possibilities provided by the land, 
including gathering places, cultivation and harvest. Here we see ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ 
as deeply interwoven, making difficult the possibility of a clear conceptual distinction 
between the two. Massive forced displacement thus involves not just loss of land, but 
loss of the very ‘conditions of being’ that made being on earth together what it is for a 
particular group.135  
For example, in the Nuba Mountains, a man from the region told me, ‘they say, 
if you don’t have a hill, or a mountain as a group, then you don’t belong here.’ While 
there are a number of different sub-groups within the Nuba peoples, with different 
languages, and other variations, ‘central to all the Nuba groups’ is the idea of 
‘identifying with a mountain or with a hill.’ Every Nuba village is beneath a mountain 
or a hill, and ‘from the moment you are born,’ he said, you are ‘aware of this 
imposing presence above you […] each tribe identifies with a different mountain or 
hill, and often the name of the hill is also the name of the tribe.’ Crucially, he 
continued, the mountains ‘are not just looked on as stone, they have spiritual 
importance,’ and from a young age children grow up with ‘stories of spiritual forces 
that dwell in the mountains and caves.’ People of the Nuba Mountains have also 
historically sought safety and refuge inside the caves in times of adversity. The hills 
therefore are ‘central to Nuba identity.’136 As Abed writes of communities with a 
territorially bounded culture:  
 
Landscape can become an important element of myths and a central feature 
of the traditions and spiritual life of a nation. The stories and legends that 
add substance to cultural practices often dramatize specific aspects of a 
group’s territory. Prominent landmarks become the narrators of a nation’s 
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historical trajectory, and different features of the landscape come to be 
permeated with meanings.137 
 
A woman from Darfur commented: ‘People do not deal with land like a resource, but 
as something they are connected to from their ancestors. This is part of connecting me 
to who I am.’138  Card talks about the ties, bonds, and relationships that connect 
individuals to their past and their potential futures. Here we can see that these ties 
extend beyond familial, friendship or community relationships, to deep relationships 
with the land. To be severed from the relationships they had with this land was 
experienced as a humiliation: 'Our humiliation, part of it is to take away our land, and 
make us landless, or like less human that we are not entitled to this land.’139  
Describing the mass displacements and the dire situation in the camps, one man 
from Darfur turned directly to the question of what ‘genocide’ means for him:  
 
For me, genocide is not just like killing an ethnic group. My experience is 
[...] in genocide you don’t even need to kill, but you try to destroy, like 
displace, and no education, no health, no jobs. You leave them like that. 
Like, people live in a different country, like in a different world. The 
genocide is not just killing people. Genocide means killing but not actual 
killing. Killing people slowly, like you take away their dignity, and their 
business, education. This in my opinion is genocide.140  
Touching on the issues of ‘anticipatory denial’ discussed above, he also talked about 
how, in the context of greater international attention on Khartoum’s atrocities, the 
government has tried to 'find another way' that is not killing, but 'parallel to killing.' 
The government, in his view, has attempted to 'destroy the people' economically, and 
by denying education and healthcare. The international community is less responsive 
to this kind of destruction; they will only pay attention to massacres, he said.141   
As a genocidal process goes on, in Card’s powerful words, 'the lives of 
individuals contract, although the population may not. Capacities for interaction 
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atrophy. What remains approaches a living death, at least, social death.’ 142  The 
population in the camps may indeed be expanding, but on multiple levels, the lives of 
individuals continue to contract. The image of lives 'contracting' vividly captured not 
only the condition of a significant number of people, but also a process of destruction 
– the destruction of a form of life itself, a way of being in the world. The testimony 
compels us to see the camps themselves as sites of genocide, contexts within which 
the possibility of ‘social vitality’ has been eroded. Communities and individuals 
atrophy. They become isolated, demoralized, fragmented, politically and 
economically debilitated, and dislocated from the lands, local ecologies, social 
patterns and cultures with which communal and individual identities are constitutively 
interwoven. This fragmentation becomes increasingly intractable over time. After a 
few years in the camps, one man told me, ‘everything about the past is forgotten – 
their culture, their way of life, livelihood. This is why the social death applies to 
them.’ 143  There is of course an important resonance here with Hannah Arendt’s 
assertion that genocide creates not just actual corpses, but also ‘living corpses’ – a 
space between life and death.144 Social death could also be read as akin to Agamben’s 
concept of ‘bare life.’145 
Capturing this type of harm is particularly important in the context of a number 
of official statements that have been made about Darfur in recent years. For example, 
Scott Gration, then US Special Envoy to Sudan, claimed in June 2009 that the 
Sudanese government was no longer carrying out a 'co-ordinated' programme of mass 
murder in Darfur, thus in Totten’s view, 'inferring that the United States no longer 
considered the situation in Darfur to be a case of ongoing genocide.' What we see, 
Gration said, 'is the remnants of genocide.’ 146
 
Moreover, in August 2009, the 
commander of the UNAMID force declared that:    
 
As of today, I would not say there is a war going on in Darfur. [...] What 
you have is security issues more now. Banditry, localised issues, people 
trying to resolve issues over water and land at a local level. But real war as 
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such, I think we are over that.147  
 
In contrast, the argument presented here reveals the obfuscation implicit in these 
statements. The idea that genocide ‘ends’ when coordinated mass killings or physical 
attacks more generally cease, involves the discursive erasure of a profound and often 
irreparable harm. 
 
Social ‘Death’? Reconstruction and Revitalisation 
But is it the case that such harm is always irreparable? ‘Death’ suggests a permanent 
ending, an unrecoverable state. To describe victims and survivors of genocide as 
‘socially dead’ implies they will never — can never — be socially ‘alive’ again. Thus, 
we have something of a conceptual binary (dead/alive), which closes off the 
conceptual and phenomenological terrain between the two. This may be interpreted as 
insufficiently recognising individuals’ and communities’ potential resilience, 
evidence of which abounded in the communities engaged with for this study.   
However, this would be to misconstrue Card on this issue, for she includes in 
her account the possibility that identity and social vitality be reclaimed and 
revitalised: 'Social death has degrees and typically stages. Sometimes social vitality is 
recoverable or can be recreated in new forms. Often it is not recoverable or the new 
forms are severely impoverished.’ 148  This reflects the diversity of experience 
described by interviewees. For example, some unequivocally described their 
experience in terms of a total ‘loss of identity’ and felt the notion of ‘social death’ 
correctly captured their experience (‘it just speaks to me exactly like what has 
happened’149). However, a slightly greater number did not agree with the strength of 
such a statement, specifically the use of the word ‘death,’ despite acknowledging a 
deep sense of loss related to their identity. Nevertheless, most made clear that 
something unrecoverable had indeed been lost, despite their ability to partially 
reconstruct a sense of identity and community. Moreover, as discussed above, for 
those in the refugee and IDP camps, despite greater geographical proximity to their 
homeland, their experience of social death was much more extreme in comparison to 
those in the diaspora.  
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The community I engaged with in New York in particular is probably 
somewhat unique within the context of the worldwide Sudanese diaspora community. 
One interviewee described it as a ‘special’ community:  
 
In New York, the presence of Darfuris is totally different to that in the 
refugee camps. Most people in New York are educated, at least to BA 
level, some MA, and some are physicians. Also, most people know at least 
some other people here before they come to us, or they came from the 
same area or town [in Darfur]. The majority of us are from North Darfur, 
the majority from El Fasher area or surrounding towns and villages. So 
people here have the same social [and] cultural background. Most want to 
mobilise and raise awareness, to try to educate their community. That’s 
why the community here is special. Everybody is working very hard to 
help back in Darfur. So people in Darfur have been able to continue the 
same culture they had in Darfur. People support each other socially, 
financially, psychologically. People will come to visit you, we gather 
together, if something bad happened back at home [...] people become like 
your parents, they will share the cost of your wedding.150 
 
Many also talked about how they had been able to retain a sense of connection to their 
identity and cultural heritage. Some from the Nuba Mountains, for example, described 
how on arrival in the USA or the UK, they changed their names back to their original 
Nuba names, discarding the Arabic ones they had been forced to adopt.151
 
In fact, 
some felt that the conflict, the attack on their community, and their role as a voice 
outside the country for those they had left behind in Sudan had led to a stronger, 
prouder sense of collective identity:  
 
Here, [in New York] we are able to speak our language, Zaghawa. Darfuri 
children who [are still in Sudan], will lose their language, as they are only 
able to speak Arabic. We stick together, and we try to keep these things 
alive, [such as] language [...]. We have many activities here for the 
Muslim holidays, Eid. We try to do the same as we would back home. We 
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come together to pray, we have food, people sing our traditional songs, 
and we talk together about what is going on back in Darfur, and how we 
can help the traditions survive, how we save the traditions.152  
 
Many also mentioned their use of technology and social media, and how these 
facilitated their ability to keep their sense of community and connection to home 
alive. Some, for example, would show their children YouTube videos of traditional 
ceremonial dance, and used the Internet to teach them their tribal language. I was told 
of ‘Nuba days,’ festivals, and weekly Skype meetings many in the international 
diaspora hold in order to discuss the situation in Sudan.153 Clearly these communities 
have been able, in Card’s terms, to revitalize their collective identities, at least to 
some degree.  
Although Card does not flesh out what such a process of ‘revitalization’ 
means or entails, the relational interpretation of social death put forward above 
potentially provides some starting points for deeper theoretical and practical 
understanding. Any meaningful process of reconstruction arguably cannot be an 
identical reproduction of institutions and practices. Rather, as Powell writes, it would 
be more accurate to describe such as process as a ‘re-growth of the network of 
practical relations that sustain collective identification.’ This would crucially involve 
a ‘restoration of the process of change and transformation’ so integral to the ‘vitality 
and coherence’ of groups (understood, on Elias’s terms, as ‘figurations’). Moreover, 
according to Powell, ‘Given enough space and time for successful healing, even the 
trauma of genocide might be retroactively integrated into that transformational 
process.’154 But what, in the face of cultural devastation and deep collective trauma, 
does this mean, particularly if it constitutes an attempt to in some way reconstruct a 
now-impossible way of life? How does such a ‘re-growth’ maintain continuity, 
consistency and connection with the past?  
In his book, Radical Hope, Jonathan Lear argues it is the avoidance of despair 
that enables a community to respond to the collapse of a way of life. Crucially, for 
Lear, the avoidance of despair is possible only in the presence of a hope that is 
‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand 
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what it is.’ Such a hope is ‘radical’: ‘Radical hope anticipates a good for which those 
who have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts with which to understand 
it.’155  Radical hope is possible, however, only if it is rooted in the group’s own 
resources, culture and traditions; amidst great uncertainty, new meanings and 
possibilities must be drawn from old concepts, definitions and ideas that on their own, 
no longer make sense. This amounts to a creative renewal that can transcend cultural 
collapse, and open up new pathways for the continuation of a cohesive collectivity, 
albeit in a form that is not known or determined in advance. 
Whilst such a hope may indeed have underpinned processes of cultural 
reconstruction in the Darfuri and Nuba Mountains diaspora communities, many 
interviewees nevertheless communicated they were unable to feel the same bonds of 
community attachment, or experience the natural sense of identification to the wider 
society and surroundings that they had previously in Sudan. The majority made clear 
they longed to return to home. Many also expressed uncertainty about the future, and 
it remains to be seen whether the processes of re-growth and revitalization described 
can be sustained into the future.  
Moreover, it seems the emergence of radical hope, and in particular the 
possibility that it could be concretely acted upon or manifested, is not entirely 
context-independent, even though it may itself be the product of significant upheaval. 
Arguably, certain very basic conditions must be met, such as relative physical safety, 
sustenance, and the (even if rudimentary) means and resources (broadly conceived) 
for building new patterns of collective life. However, for those in the refugee and IDP 
camps in and around Sudan, these conditions simply do not exist. Nevertheless, 
Lear’s concept of radical hope arguably illuminates a crucial dimension of Card’s 
(insufficiently theorized) notion of ‘revitalization,’ offering valuable insights to those 
seeking to build or support such a process. The concrete means by which such a hope 
may spark or galvanize broader process of reconstruction should be a central 
empirical and theoretical concern of genocide studies. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has not been to reduce genocide’s distinctiveness or the harm it 
causes to social death, or indeed to preclude the possibility (indeed likelihood) that 
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genocide involves layered and multiple forms of harm that intersect and overlap in 
complex ways. For example, compatible with (but with a different emphasis from) the 
approach explored here, Lemkin himself viewed genocide as damaging to humanity 
and ‘world culture as a whole’ based on its destruction of culture and the associated 
loss of ‘future contributions to the world.’156 And as Benhabib has explored, Arendt 
developed a similar ‘philosophical condemnation’ of genocide as the destruction of 
‘human plurality,’ based on which she argued it was a ‘crime against the human 
condition as such.’157 Damien Short has recently made an interesting contribution to 
this perspective, arguing that globalized capitalist expansion and its inevitable 
environmental destructions threaten the genocidal eradication of cultural difference, 
in the process undermining the very possibility of continued human existence on the 
planet due to culture’s function as humanity’s primary adaptive mechanism.158   
Still, by grounding us in the experiences of victims and survivors, centering 
the phenomenological concept of social death in how we think and talk about 
genocide in various forums may have significant implications, not only for how the 
harm of genocide is grasped, but also for how we perceive and act on incipient or 
unfolding situations, how genocidal practices and contexts are recognized and 
defined, and how prevention, intervention and post-genocide reconstruction and 
healing are conceived. As was suggested, the lens of social death has potential to 
reshape what Thaler describes as the ‘perceptive and interpretive frameworks’ around 
genocide by foregrounding a tangible narrative of human suffering that engages 
empathetic ‘political imagination.’159 It was also suggested that focusing on the harm 
of genocide, rather than myopically attending to perpetrator intentions and 
subjectivity, may facilitate an openness to diverse and novel manifestations genocidal 
processes and methods, thereby potentially helping to combat various forms of 
anticipatory denial and ‘genocide blindness.’160 Attention to the distinctive harms of 
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genocide, moreover, may reveal much to us about ourselves by shedding light on the 
‘ontological vulnerabilities,’ as Lear puts it, of the human condition more generally.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the concrete implications of 
such a conception for the meaning and practice of any form of ‘anti-genocide’ action. 
The more modest aim here has been to demonstrate the value and validity of the lens 
social death for capturing the experiences of genocide’s victims and survivors, and for 
providing a (flexible) conceptual anchor that can support our ability to make sense of 
– and keep our focus attuned to – the depth, extent, and existential nature of (at least 
one of) genocide’s distinctive harms. If the norms and practices of our responses to 
genocide are to be ethically sufficient, they must be based on a conception of 
genocide that recognizes these harms. It is hoped this article contributes towards the 
general reorientation required for this to be possible.  
 
 
